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McKEIVER v. PENNSYLVANIA: THE LAST
WORD ON JUVENILE COURT
ADJUDICATIONS?
Orman W. Ketchamt
In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has required the
juvenile court system to afford youthful offenders certain due process
safeguards that had previously been constitutionally mandated only in
adult criminal trials. Hence, the world of juvenile justice has waited
with some impatience for a judicial determination of exactly what
"'essentials of due process and fair treatment' "" are required to ensure
fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings.
It is now clear from the several opinions in McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania2 that the present Court has rejected Justice Black's view that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the applica-
tion of all provisions of the Bill of Rights to state juvenile proceed-
ings.a The Court held in McKeiver that a right to trial by jury is not
essential to assure fundamental fairness in a juvenile court trial. This
decision may well mark the Court's final chapter on the adjudicative
phase of juvenile justice.
t Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia. A.B. 1940, Princeton University;
LL.B. 1947, Yale University.
1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967), quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.. 541, 562
(1966).
2 403 U.S. 528 (1971). McKeiver involved the review of three state supreme court
decisions, one from North Carolina and two from Pennsylvania. In the first Pennsylvania
decision, Joseph McKeiver, age 16 at the time, was charged with robbery, larceny, and
receiving stolen goods. McKeiver had allegedly participated with 20 or 30 other
youths in pursuing three young teenagers and taking 25 cents from them. McKeiver
had no record of prior arrests and was gainfully employed. The testimony of the victims,
moreover, was described by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as inconsistent and "weak."
The second Pennsylvania case involved Edward Terry, then 15. Terry was charged with
conspiracy and assault and battery on a police officer after he allegedly struck a
policeman with his fists and a stick when the officer intervened in a fight. In both cases
counsel sought a jury trial.
The North Carolina case involved Barbara Burrus and a group of 45 other black
youths ranging in age from 11 to 15. The charges arose out of a series of demonstrations
in late 1968. The youths were charged with willfully impeding traffic, and one youth was
also charged with disrupting school sessions and defacing school property. Over counsel's
objection the public was excluded; a jury trial in each case was denied.




Tm RATIONALE OF McKeiver
The Court's opinion begins by tracing the line of six cases relating
to juveniles which began with Haley v. Ohio4 in 1948 and progressed
through Gallegos v. Colorado,5 Kent v. United States,6 In re Gault,7
4 332 U.S. 596 (1948). Haley involved the admissability of a confession taken from
a 15 year-old boy. The boy had been arrested about midnight on a charge of murder
and questioned by various police officers until approximately five o'clock in the morning.
During this time the boy did not have the benfit of counsel or even the presence of a
friend. When he was confronted by the alleged confessions of his "accomplices," he signed
a confession typed by the police. The confession was subsequently admitted into evidence
over his objection. In reversing his conviction, the Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Douglas, held that the methods used in obtaining the confession violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Douglas noted that "[nleither man
nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional re-
quirements of due process of law." Id. at 601.
5 370 U.S. 49 (1962). In Gallegos a 14 year-old boy allegedly assaulted and robbed
an elderly man. The boy was arrested 12 days later, convicted of "assault to injure,"
and committed to a reformatory for an indeterminate period of time. Subsequently the
victim died and the boy was charged with first degree murder. At trial, a formal con-
fession signed by the youth prior to the victim's death was introduced in evidence. The
confession had been obtained before the boy had been brought before a court and after
he had been held for five days without the benefit of advice of counsel, friend, or parent
(despite the fact that his mother had attempted to see him). The Court, through Justice
Douglas, held that the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the confession violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 55.
6 385 U.S. 541 (1966). Kent involved an order by a juvenile court waiving its juris-
diction and remitting a 16 year-old juvenile to an adult court for trial. The Supreme
Court held that the discretion of a juvenile court in the District of Columbia to deter-
mine whether to waive jurisdiction was not unlimited, but rather its valid exercise
"assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory
requirement of a 'full investigation."' Id. at 553.
7 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault had been taken into custody fol-
lowing a complaint that he had made obscene telephone calls. After a hearing in juvenile
court, the youth was committed to the Arizona reformatory until he reached age 21.
In an appeal from a judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court affirming the denial of
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional
guarantee of due process applied to proceedings in which juveniles are charged as de-
linquents. Specifically the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Fortas, held that
(1) a juvenile court adjudication of delinquency "must measure up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment" (id. at 30); (2) adequate notice must be furnished to the youth
and his parents or guardians informing them of the specific charges involved, and such
notice must be given "at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in
advance of the hearing to permit preparation" (id. at 3); (3) the youth and his parents
or guardians must be informed of their right to be represented by counsel and, if they
are unable to afford counsel, counsel must be appointed (id. at 41); (4) the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to juvenile court proceedings (id. at 55);
and (5) "absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency ... cannot be sustained
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and Debacker v. Brainard,8 to In re Winship9 in 1970. Each successive
case, with the exception of DeBacker, imposed additional due process
requirements on the fact-finding or adjudicative stage of state juvenile
proceedings. Now it seems that the tide has turned. In all probability,
Winship established the high water mark of Supreme Court reforma-
tion of juvenile trial proceedings.
The Court's decision is expressed in several interrelated opinions.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart,
-wrote the prevailing opinion. The concurring opinion of Justice White
is similar to Blackmun's and, combined with Justice Harlan's special
concurrence, provided a majority of the Court. Justice Brennan con-
curred and dissented. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Black dissented.
Justice Blackmun's opinion is in two parts-an adoption of the
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania' 0 and an enumeration
of thirteen reasons why a jury trial is not a constitutionally required
element of due process in the adjudicative stage of a juvenile proceed-
ing.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with one justice dissenting,
had identified four elements in the Pennsylvania juvenile process
which it believed made the right to a jury trial less essential to a
juvenile than to an adult, and thus not constitutionally mandated.
First, the court was convinced that juvenile court judges "take a differ-
ent view of their role than that taken by their counterparts in the
criminal courts."" It also believed that the diagnostic and rehabilita-
tive services available to the juvenile justice system are "far superior to
those available in the regular criminal process."' Thirdly, the Pennsyl-
vania court was of the opinion that a finding of juvenile delinquency
"is significantly different from and less onerous than a finding of crim-
in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examina-
tion . . . ." (id. at 57).
8 896 U.S. 28 (1969). In a per curiam opinion the Court refused to consider the
question of whether a youth has a constitutional right to trial by jury in juvenile court
proceedings. The Court reasoned that since the appellant's hearing had preceded the
Court's decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145 (1968), which was given only
prospective application in DeStefano v. Woods, 892 US. 681 (1968), the case was an
inappropriate one for resolution of the jury trial issue. Justices Douglas and Black
dissented from the Court's dismissal. 396 US. at 33, 85.
9 397 US. 358 (1970). In this case the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, an essential element in criminal trials, is required by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment when a youth is charged with an act which would constitute a
criminal offense if committed by an adult.
10 In re Terry, 438 Pa. 39, 265 A.2d 850 (1970).
11 Id. at 348, 265 A.2d at 354-55.
12 Id. at 348-49, 265 A.2d at 855.
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inal guilt.' 3 Finally, it expressed the belief that the juvenile process al-
ready imposed sufficient constitutional protections to ensure "sufficient
protection" for juveniles. 4 To grant a right to trial by jury, the court
stated, would be so disruptive that it "might well destroy the tradi-
tional character of juvenile proceedings."' 5
This list of factors differentiating a juvenile's need for a jury trial
at the adjudicative stage from an adult's need is so subjective as to
be unworthy of citation in a Supreme Court opinion. Having spent
fourteen years on a juvenile court bench (which incidentally afforded
juveniles the right to a jury trial), I could readily dispute the first
three factors from personal experience. Moreover, the attitude of juve-
nile court judges, the rehabilitative facilities available, and the con-
sequences of a finding of guilt are substantially irrelevant to the issue
of whether a jury should be available to make findings of fact during
a juvenile's trial. The fourth element in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's opinion, the determination that a reasonable balance has al-
ready been established between due process rights and traditional
juvenile court informality, seems to be the real ground for both the
decision of the state court and the Supreme Court.
What of the baker's dozen reasons stated by Justice Blackmun
for reaching his conclusion? Several fall into the category of supportive
precedents: the 1967 Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and
Youth Crime of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice' did not recommend the use of jury trials in
juvenile proceedings; neither did the Standard Juvenile Court Act
promulgated by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in
1959;17 nor the Uniform Juvenile Court Act endorsed by the American
Bar Association in 1968;18 nor the Legislative Guide for Drafting Fam-
ily and Juvenile Court Acts published by the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare in 1969.1 The majority of state legis-
latures similarly rejected jury trials when they established their juvenile
'3 Id. at 349, 265 A.2d at 355 (emphasis in original).
'4 Id. at 350, 265 A.2d at 355.
15 Id.
16 PEsmENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & AnMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967).
17 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, CoMmrIEE ON REVISION OF THE
STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT (6th ed. 1959).
18 UNIFoRm Juv. Cr. ACT § 24(a), in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMI'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 263 (1968).
19 W. SHERIDAN, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR DRAFTING FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT ACTS
§ 29(a) (HEW 1969).
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court systems; 20 Congress, in adopting a new juvenile court code for the
District of Columbia in 1970,21 abolished the previously established
right to a jury trial; and the majority of state appellate courts that have
ruled upon the issue since Gault have rejected the claim that a juvenile
is entitled to a jury trial.22 Justice Blackmun also expressed the view
that juvenile proceedings are not inherently unfair, rather their abuses
derive from a lack of resources.23 He made the further suggestion that
state trial judges are free to use advisory juries if they choose.24
Thus pruned, Justice Blackmun's reasons are reduced to five in
number:
(1) a jury's verdict on the facts is not an essential element to en-
sure a fair trial;
(2) a state has the right to experiment with juvenile procedures
without the encumbrance of juries;
(3) a trial by jury will not cure the existing defects in the juvenile
justice system;
(4) a right to a jury trial will "remake the juvenile proceeding
into a fully adversary process ' 25 inimical to the informal juve-
nile court ideal; and
(5) a requirement for adjudicative procedures identical to adult
criminal proceedings will deprive the juvenile court of its
reason for a separate existence.
What is needed, stated Justice Blackmun, is neither criminal nor
civil procedure, but a balance between procedural orderliness and the
preservation of the good motives, special concern, and paternal attention
20 See, e.g., Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-229 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.09(2) (1961);
IND. CODE § 81-5-7-15 (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(1) (1971); NJ. STAT. ANN § 2A:
4-35 (1952): Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 247
(1965); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.04.030 (1962).
21 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(a) (Supp. IV, 1971). The Senate, in enacting legislation
for juveniles in the District of Columbia, saw the elimination of trial by jury as an
essential element in "telescoping" judicial procedure. S. REP. No. 620, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 13-14 (1969).
22 See, e.g., In re Fucini, 44 I. 2d 805, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970); Bible v. State, 253 Ind.
373, 254 N.E.2d 319 (1970); In re "W.," 106 N.J. Super. 129, 254 A.2d 334 (Juv. & Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1969); In re "D.," 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970); In re Agler, 19
Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
23 403 US. at 548. This statement is in some conflict with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's approval of juvenile court services. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 839, 348-49, 265 A.2d 350,
355 (1970).
24 408 U.S. at 548.
25 Id. at 545.
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of the juvenile court tradition.26 In accord with the fourth factor in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion, Justice Blackmun and a major-
ity of the Court concluded that a balance had already been reached.
For these Justices, providing a juvenile with the right to a jury trial
would be an overreaction likely to upset this balance.
II
THE COURT'S ATrTUDE TowARDs JuRY TRIALs
The Court's view that a jury is not essential to assure fundamental
fairness, although expressed in the context of juvenile proceedings,
may have a far wider impact. The appointment to the Supreme Court
of Justices Powell and Rehnquist may contribute to a fundamental
reversal of the Court's attitude, expressed in Duncan v. Louisiana27
in 1968, concerning the importance of the jury as a fact-finding agent
in judicial procedures. From his public speeches, 28 it seems that Chief
Justice Burger would prefer to eliminate the use of juries wherever
legally possible, believing that they are less efficient than a qualified
judge. Despite his majority opinion in Duncan, Justice White expressed
a certain disdain for the jury system in his concurring opinion in
McKeiver: "Although the function of the jury is to find facts, that
body is not necessarily or even probably better at the job than the
conscientious judge.' '29 He spoke of the jury as a means of permitting
community participation in the legal process and of preventing abuses
of power in cases where serious punishment may result. Because he
saw the juvenile justice system as "eschewing blameworthiness and pun-
ishment for evil choice," 0 the jury as a curb on judicial power, in
his opinion, is not needed in juvenile proceedings. Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White and Blackmun all seem to reject the populist princi-
ple that scrutiny of judicial proceedings-as that provided by a jury
of peers-improves the quality of justice in the courts. Thus, at least
three Justices now sitting appear to have a low regard for the jury as
a fact-finding body. Moreover, Justice Harlan, who dissented in Dun-
can, took the position in his McKeiver concurring opinion that neither
26 Id. at 547.
27 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
28 "Address by Justice Burger, July 5, 1971," in The State of the Federal Judiciary-
1971, 57 A.B.A.J. 855, 858 (1971).
29 403 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added).
So Id. at 552.
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fundamental fairness nor the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires a jury for any person-adult or juvenile. 81
Perhaps the most fascinating view of the jury function is expressed
by Justice Brennan in his separate opinion in McKeiver, in which
he concurred with the majority with regard to the cases coming from
Pennsylvania, but joined the dissent with regard to the case from
North Carolina.3 2 The primary function of the jury, according to
Justice Brennan, is to allow "executive redress"3 3 as protection against
misuse of the judicial process. "The availability of trial by jury allows
an accused to protect himself against possible oppression by what is
in essence an appeal to the community conscience, as embodied in the
jury that hears his case."34 In Pennsylvania the press was generally
admitted, no person desired by a litigant was excluded, and there was
no statutory prohibition against admission of the public to juvenile
trials. Justice Brennan found these procedures to constitute a reason-
able substitute for the jury's function of protecting juveniles from
oppression by the government and from "the compliant, biased, or ec-
centric judge."3 5 North Carolina law, on the other hand, either
permitted or required the exclusion of the general public from juvenile
trials.
III
ADMINISTRATIvE PROBLEMS IN JUVENILE COURTS
In addition to the listed reasons for rejecting juvenile jury trials,
there is, I believe, an unstated administrative concern underlying the
majority opinion. Despite the efforts of amicus curiae briefs, several
Justices seem to fear that a court management crisis would be pre-
cipitated if the already labored administration of the nation's juvenile
courts was burdened with the need to provide jury trials.
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, made some reference
to the practical aspects of jury trials for juveniles.38 To rebut the in-
ference that a jury trial is a more traumatic event for a juvenile than a
81 Id. at 557.
32 See note 2 supra.
33 403 U.S. at 555.
84 Id. at 554-55.
85 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
36 403 US. at 561-62.
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proceeding in which the judge decides issues of fact, he relied exten-
sively on the expressions of a Rhode Island Family Court judge8 7
The fact that a juvenile realizes that his case will be decided
by twelve objective citizens would allow the court to retain its
meaningfulness without causing any more trauma than a trial
before a judge who ... may be influenced by... prior contacts.
To agree that a jury trial would expose a juvenile to a traumatic
experience is to lose sight of the real traumatic experience of in-
carceration without due process.88
The most traumatic experience is, according to Justice Douglas,
the feeling of not being "entitled to the same [procedural] protection
as an adult."8 9 But even Justice Douglas, in this rare instance depending
upon the opinion of a trial judge, does not refer to the administrative
aspects of jury trials for juveniles. The suspicion persists that the
practical consequences on the administrative functioning of state juve-
nile courts played a large part in the Court's decision to deny juveniles
a right to a jury trial.
IV
IMPACT ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
For whatever reasons the Court decided not to grant the right
of a trial by jury to a juvenile, it is apparent that a majority of the
Justices believed they should refrain from further legal reformation
of the juvenile court trial process at this time. The Justices seem to
have concluded that the due process requirements previously ordered
by the Court have assured the necessary "constitutional domestica-
tion"40 of which Justice Fortas spoke in Gault. The Court has no
juvenile case on its calendar this term, and it is unlikely that in the
near future the Court will accept new cases dealing with the adjudica.
tive phase of juvenile proceedings.4 1
If the Court accepts any juvenile case in the future, it will probably
be one dealing with the many facets of juvenile pre-adjudicatory pro-
cedure, in which the juvenile justice system differs markedly from the
adult criminal process. Although legal reformers appear eager to con-
37 Id. at 562-72, quoting In re McCloud (Providence, R.I. Farn. Ct., Jan. 15, 1971)
(DeCiantis, J.).
8 403 U.S. at 563-64, quoting In re McCloud (Providence, R.I. Fain. Ct., Jan. 15, 1971).
39 403 U.S. at 562, quoting In re McCloud (Providence, R.I. Fain. Ct., Jan. 15, 1971).
40 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
41 But see Mailliard v. Gonzalez, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal filed, 40
U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. April 9, 1971) (No. 70-120).
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front the juvenile justice system with its failure to establish a right to
treatment at the dispositional or correctional end of the process, there
seems little chance that the Court as presently constituted will review
such cases. The Court will, however, find it considerably more difficult
to brush aside demands for equal protection of the law concerning
police enforcement techniques that precede any referral of the accused
to adult or juvenile court. 42
On the whole, proponents of a separate juvenile justice system
seem generally satisfied with the Court's decision in McKeiver. Their
fear of the major administrative reorganization necessary to implement
a jury system for state juvenile courts has been dispelled. The public
scrutiny of juvenile proceedings that juries would bring has been
avoided, or at least postponed. As the last sentence of Justice Black-
mun's opinion states: "Perhaps... ultimate disillusionment will come
one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it." 43
In years to come, however, it may be difficult to determine whether
the juvenile court's image suffered greater harm from the ringing and
documented criticisms of Justice Fortas in Gault or from the faint
praise expressed by Justices Blackmun, Harlan, and White in McKeiver.
Justice Blackmun remarked:
We must recognize, as the Court has recognized before, that the
fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and
early reformers of three generations ago have not been realized.
... Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stal-
wart, protective, and communicating figure the system envisaged.
The community's unwillingness to provide people and facilities
and to be concerned, the insufficiency of time devoted, the scarcity
of professional help, the inadequacy of dispositional alternatives,
and our general lack of knowledge all contribute to dissatisfaction
with the experiment. 44
Justice Harlan conceded that "juvenile delinquency proceedings have
in practice actually become in many, if not all, respects criminal
trials. ' 45 Justice White concluded that "current unhappiness with
juvenile court performance rests on dissatisfaction with the vague and
overbroad grounds for delinquency adjudications, with faulty judicial
choice as to disposition after adjudication or with the record of re-
habilitative custody, whether institutional or probationary ."4
42 See generally Coffee, Privacy Versus Parens Patriae: The Role of Police Records in
the Sentencing and Surveillance of Juveniles, 57 CoRNEL.. L. REv. 571 (1972).
43 403 US. at 551.
44 Id. at 543-44 (footnotes omitted).
45 Id. at 557.
46 Id. at 553.
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These are not the words of convinced supporters of the parens patriae
philosophy of the juvenile court movement.
In my opinion, during the years immediately ahead the juvenile
justice system may expect benevolent disinterest from the Supreme
Court. The attitude of the Department of Justice and its granting arm,
the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency, is equally passive towards
our floundering juvenile courts. Whether the attention they receive
from individual state governments, together with the zeal of dedicated
supporters, will be enough to shore up the crumbling foundations of
the independent juvenile court system is at best uncertain.
